Ambiguous Invocations of the Right to Remain Silent:
A Post-Davis Analysis and Proposal
Wayne D. Holly"
When society acts to deprive one of its members of his life,
liberty or property, it takes its most awesome steps. No general
respect for, nor adherence to, the law as a whole can well be expected without judicial recognition of the paramount need for
prompt, eminently fair and sober criminal law procedures. The
methods we employ in the enforcement of our criminal law have
aptly been called the measures by which the quality of our civilization may be judged.'
INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[n] o person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself .... ." This privilege against selfincrimination is guaranteed to state criminal defendants through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 In the context
of custodial police interrogation, the Fifth Amendment privilege confers two separate and distinct substantive rights designed to protect
suspects from the inherently coercive atmosphere of the policedominated setting.4 Once in custody5 and prior to being interroB.A., Rhode Island College, 1993 (magna cum laude); J.D., New York Law
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Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV;
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964).
4 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 448-68 (1966) (extensively describing the
"inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere").
5 The starting point for custody determinations is Miranda,which
indicated that
an individual is in "custody" when he is "deprived of his freedom of action in any
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gated,('suspects must be advised, among other things, of their right to
remain silent and their right to counsel, either retained or appointed These rights, and the procedural safeguards designed to
preserve them, are indispensable to ensuring that inherently compelling pressures do not "undermine the individual's will to resist
and ...compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so

freely." Once a suspect invokes the right to silence, police questioning must immediately cease and the suspect's decision must be
"scrupulously honored."9 Any statement thereafter obtained from
the individual will be presumed coerced unless the suspect knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his previously invoked
right to silence.'0
Likewise, where an accused indicates to police that he wishes to
have the assistance of counsel, no further interrogation is permissible
until either counsel is present," or the individual "initiates" conversation with the police and thereafter knowingly, voluntarily, and intelsignificant way." Miranda,384 U.S. at 444. Ultimately, the inquiry is "whether there
is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated
with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (quoting
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). Courts should consider "how a
reasonable [person] in the suspect's position would have understood his situation."
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984).
6 The Miranda Court defined "custodial interrogation"
as "questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1979), the Court held that "interrogation"
refers "not only to express questioning, but also to any words or action on the part of
the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect." Id.
, See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-73, 479. Summarizing its holding, the Miranda
Court stated:
[U]nless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person
of his right to silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be
scrupulously honored ....[the suspect] must be warned prior to any
questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one
will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Id. at 479.
8 Id. at 467; see United States v. Ramirez, 79 F.3d 298, 304 (2d Cir. 1996)
("Miranda warnings are intended principally to safeguard the suspect's privilege
against self-incrimination.").
See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
10 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 483 (1981); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462
U.S. 1039, 1044-46 (1983) (plurality opinion).
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474. See generally Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146
(1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
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ligently waives his right to have an attorney present. 12 Under federal
law, the government bears the burden of proving a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver by a preponderance of the evidence.' 3
The Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent and to the presence of counsel during custodial police interrogation are unique in
that, like few others, they must first be invoked before being exercised. 14 Thus, while complicated threshold issues such as (i) whether
an individual is "in custody"; 5 (ii) whether police words or actions
constitute "interrogation"; 6 and even (iii) whether the individual

12

See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 680-81, 684; Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045; Edwards, 451

U.S. at 485.
13 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1986); United States v.
RomanZarate, 115 F.3d 778, 782 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96,
99 (2d Cir. 1991). Some states require, as a matter of state constitutional law, that
the government prove a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 511 A.2d 80 (1986).
14 The Fifth Amendment protects against
compelled self-incrimination. It does
not preclude an individual from volunteering statements that may be incriminatory.
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478. "If, therefore, [an individual] desires the protection of
the privilege, he must claim it or he will not be considered to have been 'compelled'
within the meaning of the Amendment." Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427
(1984) (quoting United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943)) (footnote omitted); see Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 150 (1949) (noting that "the privilege
against self-incrimination must be claimed"). For this reason, the Supreme Court
has long recognized that the privilege against self-incrimination "generally is not selfexecuting." Murphy, 465 U.S. at 425. An exception, however, has been recognized
in the context of custodial police interrogation where it is well settled that a waiver
will not be found from silence alone, but rather must be shown to have been knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. See id.
at 429-30; Miranda,384 U.S. at 475;
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). However, it is equally wellsettled that both the Miranda right to counsel and right to silence must affirmatively
be invoked in order to gain the protection of the respective procedural safeguards
erected to protect those dual rights. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 101-04
(1975) (recognizing that an accused must invoke the right to remain silent in order
to "cut off questioning"); Towne v. Dugger, 899 F.2d 1104, 1107 (11th Cir. 1990)
("[T]he threshold inquiry with regard to the waiver of the right to counsel is
whether the right to counsel was in fact invoked."); United States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d
971, 974 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[T]he [Miranda] right to counsel must be 'specifically invoked'[.]"). Moreover, in many cases, the issue for decision is whether a suspect's
behavior, after having previously waived his Miranda rights, is sufficiently clear to reinvoke them. Thus, while the bare privilege itself may not need to be claimed in the
context of custodial interrogation, since invocation is required to trigger all of the
procedural safeguards essential to effectuate the privilege, invocation plays a crucial
role in custodial interrogation jurisprudence. See State v. Green, 655 So. 2d 272,280
n.8 (La. 1995) ("When Miranda protections are not specifically invoked ...police
may continue questioning the suspect in the hope of obtaining a statement ...
see also infraPart II.A.
5 see supra note 5.
l6

See supra note 6.
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knows that he is speaking to an agent of the government 7 will determine whether the rights "attached" in the particular context, an
equally fundamental issue asks whether a custodially interrogated
suspect even invoked his rights as a condition precedent to their exercise." The degree of clarity with which a suspect must invoke his
Fifth Amendment rights has been the subject of considerable disagreement among the federal circuits - until relatively recently.' 9 In
Davis v. United States,0 the United States Supreme Court considered
whether the statement "[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer" was sufficient to invoke a suspect's right to counsel, when uttered approximately 90 minutes into a Naval Investigative Service (NIS) interrogation in connection with the beating death of a sailor, where the
suspect had earlier waived his Miranda rights. 21 Answering the question in the negative, the Court held that an equivocal or ambiguous
request for counsel2 2 is insufficient to invoke the right to counsel and

does not require law enforcement officers to cease the interrogation
nor limit further questions to those seeking clarification. 3 Since
17 In Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 294 (1990), the Court held that Miranda
warnings are not required where the custodial suspect is unaware that the person to
whom he is speaking is a law enforcement officer. See id.
18See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984) (noting that courts "must
determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel."); Mosley, 423 U.S. at
101-04 (stating that invocation of the right to remain silent is a condition precedent
to cutting off police questioning).
1 Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Davis
v. United States,
512 U.S. 452 (1994), a tripartite split of authority existed among the state and federal courts regarding whether an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney
was sufficient to invoke the Miranda right to counsel. See Jane M. Faulkner, Case
Note, So You Kinda, Sorta, Think You Might Need a Lawyer?: Ambiguous Requests for
Counsel After Davis v. United States, 49 ARK. L. REv. 275, 282 (1996). The three approaches have commonly been referred to as (1) the "threshold-of-clarity" approach,
(2) the "per se invocation" approach, and (3) the "clarification" approach. Id.; see
Davis, 512 U.S. at 456 (quoting lower court's description of the three approaches);
United States v. Davis, 36 M.J. 337, 341 (C.M.A. 1993).
20 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
2 Id. at 454-55; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
467-73, 479 (1966).
During oral argument, the Court questioned whether a distinction should be
made between ambiguous and equivocal statements. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 35-36, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (No. 92-1949). Ultimately,
the Court drew no such distinction in its opinion. See generally Davis, 512 U.S. 452
(1994). This Article will use the terms "ambiguous" and "equivocal" interchangeably.23
See Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. Though not
required, the Court noted that "it will
often be good police practice" for police officers to clarify a suspect's ambiguous
statement. Id. at 461. A four-Justice concurrence expressed the view that "when a
suspect under custodial interrogation makes an ambiguous statement that might
reasonably be understood as expressing a wish that a lawyer be summoned (and
questioning cease), interrogators' questions should be confined to verifying whether
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Davis, the lower federal courts that have considered the question
have either assumed Davis governs ambiguous invocations of the
right to silence as well, or have specifically so held - with little or no
independent analysis.
the individual meant to ask for a lawyer." Id. at 476 (Souter,J., concurring).
24 The Eleventh Circuit was the first to apply Davis in the right to remain silent
context. See Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420 (lth Cir. 1994); see also United
States v. Mikell, 102 F.3d 470, 476 (11th Cir. 1996); Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d
1095, 1100-01 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1995); Irwin v. Singletary, 882 F. Supp. 1036, 1041
(M.D. Fla. 1995). Since then, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, and the Court of
Military Appeals, have either held or clearly indicated that Davis governs in the rightto-silence context. See United States v. Banks, 78 F.3d 1190, 1197-98 (7th Cir. 1996),
vacated sub nom., Mills v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 478 (1996), on remand, 122 F.3d
346 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom., Dunlap v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 486
(1997); United States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947, 955 (8th Cir. 1995) (though relying
heavily on pre-Davis circuit law); United States v. Lincoln, 42 M.J. 315, 320 (C.M.A.
1995). District courts in the First, Second, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have so held
with no circuit court decisions on the issue. See United States v. Andrade, 925 F.
Supp. 71, 79 (D. Mass. 1996); United States v. Maisonneuve, 950 F. Supp. 1280, 1285
(D. Vt. 1996); United States v. Ramirez, 79 F.3d 298, 305 (2d Cir. 1996) (assuming
without deciding that Davis applied), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 140 (1996); United States
v. Hicks, 967 F. Supp. 242, 250 (E.D. Mich. 1997); United States v. Sanchez, 866 F.
Supp. 1542, 1558-59 (D. Kan. 1994). The U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada predicted that the Ninth Circuit would apply Davis in the right-to-silence context, but the Ninth Circuit has recently identified the issue as an open one. See
Evans v. Demosthenes, 902 F. Supp. 1253, 1258-59 (D. Nev. 1995), affd, 98 F.3d 1174
(9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Soliz, 129 F.3d 499, 504 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997). The
Third, Fourth, Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits have also not decided the issue in a reported decision.
At the state level, the results are predictably more diverse. The courts (though
not necessarily through the state's highest court) of Arkansas, Florida, Minnesota,
New York, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin have extended Davis to
the right to silence. See Bowen v. State, 911 S.W.2d 555, 565 (Ark. 1995) (applying
federal law), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1226 (1996); State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 718-19
(Fla. 1997) (applying state law); State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277, 284-85 & n.3
(Minn. 1995) (based in part on prior state case law); People v. Cohen, 226 A.D.2d
903, 904 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 257 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996); State v. Levya, 951 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1997) (holding Davis applicable
only after waiver and not specifically addressing whether applicable to postwaiver
ambiguous indications of right to silence); State v. Bacon, 658 A.2d 54, 65 (Vt. 1995)
(applying federal law), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 837 (1995); Midkiff v. Commonwealth,
462 S.E.2d 112, 116 (Va. 1995) (relying on prior state case law and stating that "we
decline to read Mirandaso narrowly as to compel police interrogators to accept any
statement, no matter how equivocal, as an invocation of the right to remain silent");
State v. Ross, 552 N.W.2d 428, 431-33 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (applying state law).
The Supreme Court of Arizona has specifically rejected the extension of Davis
to the right-to-silence context. See State v. Strayhand, 911 P.2d 577, 592 (Ariz. 1995)
(as a matter of state law). The state supreme courts of Hawaii and New Jersey have
rejected Davis as a matter of state constitutional law, State v. Hoey, 881 P.2d 504, 524
(Haw. 1994); State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30, 63, 695 A.2d 1301, 1318 (1997), as had the
Court of Appeal of Florida, until the decision was withdrawn. See Kipp v. State, 668
So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); see also State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715 (Fla.
1997). The Supreme Court of West Virginia has not expressly rejected Davis but has
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This Article will examine the appropriate degree of clarity with
which a custodial suspect must invoke the right to remain silent and
consider whether the Supreme Court's decision in Davis supplies the
governing standard. Part I briefly reviews the Davis opinion - with
particular emphasis on the reasoning which led the Court to its decision. Parts II and III then separately analyze distinct aspects of essentially a single question - whether the principles enunciated in Davis
should be held to govern ambiguous invocations of the right to silence. Part II examines the jurisprudential differences between the
Fifth Amendment right to counsel and right to silence while Part III
discusses substantive and practical differences between the two rights.
Together, Parts II and III conclude that these differences, in light of
the express rationale of Davis, suggest the inappropriateness of a uniform standard to govern each right. Building on the prior analysis,
the Article culminates in Part IV, which proposes both a definitional
and working clarification model to govern ambiguous invocations of
the right to remain silent. Part IV additionally considers arguments
in favor of and against clarification and develops responsive guidelines for effective implementation of the proposal.
I. EQUIVOCAL INVOCATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL:
DAVIS V. UNITED STATES

In Davis v. United States,5 following the beating death of a sailor
on the Charleston Naval Base, an NIS investigation led agents to suspect that the defendant Robert Davis had committed the crime. 6
Approximately one month after the sailor's death, Davis was taken
into custody at the NIS office and advised of his rights consistent with
2
Miranda.
After waiving effectuation of those rights, both orally and
in writing, approximately one and one-half hours into the questioning, Davis stated, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer." 8 According to
refused to adopt it into its state law. See State v. Farley, 452 S.E.2d 50, 59 & n.12 (W.
Va. 1994) (noting that clarification of ambiguous invocations of the right to silence
is more consistent with Miranda than Davis and refusing to adopt Davis).
The state or territorial courts of Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming have not rendered a published decision on the issue.
25 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
26 See id. at 454.
27 See id.; Uniform Code of Military Justice Art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1994); see also
MIL. R. EVID. 305.
28 The terms "questioning," "interview," and
"interrogation" are used inter-
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the uncontradicted testimony of one of the interviewing agents, the
agents then sought to clarify whether Davis was asking for a lawyer, to
which Davis responded that he was not asking for a lawyer and did
not want a lawyer.2 Following a short break, Davis was reminded of
his Miranda rights and the interrogation proceeded for approximately another hour until Davis said, "I think I want a lawyer before I
say anything else."30 The agents then ceased the interrogation."'
At his general court-martial, the defendant's motion to suppress
statements made during the course of the interrogation was denied
on the ground that his statement, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer,"
was insufficiently clear to invoke his right to counsel, and thus the
NIS agents acted properly in clarifying the statement and proceeding
with the interview.32 Davis was convicted of unpremeditated murder,
sentenced to life imprisonment and dishonorably discharged.3, The
Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review affirmed, as did the
United States Court of Military Appeals. 4 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to address the degree of clarity with which a suspect must speak in order to invoke the Miranda right to counsel and
how law enforcement officers should respond to ambiguous references to an attorney.3 5
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor began by reaffirming
the rule of Edwards v. Arizona3 6 and its progeny: Once a suspect indicates a desire to deal with police only through counsel, police questioning must immediately cease until either counsel is present or the
accused initiates conversation with the police. 7 Focusing the issue,
the Court then observed that applicability of the Edwards rule neces-8
sarily depends on whether the accused invoked the right to counsel.3
changeably throughout this article to mean "interrogation" as defined in Miranda
and its progeny. See supra note 6.
See Davis, 512 U.S. at 455.
30 Id.
31 See id.

Id.
See id.; see also Uniform Code of Military Justice Art. 118, 10 U.S.C. § 918
(1994). In addition, Davis was required to forfeit all pay and allowances and was reduced in rank to the lowest pay grade. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 455.
34 See id. at 455-56; United States v. Davis, 36 M.J. 337 (C.M.A.
1993).
35 See Davis, 512 U.S. at 456 ("Although we have twice
previously noted the varying approaches the lower courts have adopted with respect to ambiguous or equivocal references to counsel during custodial interrogation ... we have not addressed
the issue on the merits. We granted certiorari ... to do so.") (citations omitted).
32
33

36 451 U.S. 477 (1981).

37 See Davis, 512 U.S. at 458; Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85;
see also Minnick v. Mississipi, 498 U.S. 146, 151-52 (1990).
See Davis, 512 U.S. at 458.
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The inquiry is an "objective one," which asks whether the suspect, "'at
a minimum, [made] some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney. ''9 Thus, the Court held, to invoke the right to counsel, an accused "must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently
clearly that a reasonable officer in the circumstances
would under40
stand the statement to be a request for an attorney.,
Reasoning from Edwards, the Court explained that requiring officers immediately to cease questioning when they do not reasonably
know whether the suspect desires to have counsel present, "'would
transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to
legitimate police investigative activity, ' '4' because in some instances,
an ambiguous reference to an attorney will be made by suspects who
4
do not actually desire counsel's presenceY.
Such a rule would thus
prevent the interrogation of suspects in the absence of an attorney
4 3
even when a suspect actually consents to speak without a lawyer.
Moreover, according to the Court, the need for effective law enforcement requires a bright line rule with ease of application.44 The
Edwards rule of immediate cessation of questioning upon invocation
of the right to counsel "provides a bright line that can be applied by
officers in the real world of investigation and interrogation without
unduly hampering the gathering of information., 45 Requiring an inId. at 458-59 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171,178 (1991)).
Id. at 459.
41 Id. at 460 (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S.
96, 102 (1975)).
42 See
id.
43 The Court's reasoning in this regard is seriously flawed in
light of the numerous cases that permit an adequately warned, though willing, suspect to "initiate"
conversation with the police and thereby lift the Edwards bar to reinterrogation. See,
e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (holding that if a suspect requests counsel at any time during custodial interrogation, questioning must immediately cease until an attorney is present or the accused reinitiatesconversation). See also
Reply Brief at 11, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (No. 92-1949) (arguing
that "[a] suspect who does not wish to invoke the right to counsel, but whose interrogation the police halt after an ambiguous statement that could reasonably be considered a request for counsel, is free to refuse any offer of counsel or to reinitiate
questioning").
See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461.
45 Id. Remarkably, in attempting to leave the Edwards rule undisturbed
for
"officers in the real world of investigation and interrogation," the Court rejected the
approach to ambiguous counsel references urged by amici curiae Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc.,
The National District Attorneys Association, Inc., and The National Sheriffs' Association. See Brief Amici Curiae of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc.,
Joined by International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., The National District
Attorneys Association, Inc., and The National Sheriffs' Association, In Support of the
39

40
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terrogation to cease upon an ambiguous reference to an attorney
would require law enforcement officers to make difficult interpretive
judgments about a suspect's wishes "with the threat of suppression if
they guess wrong., 46 Thus, while it may be good police practice to ask
clarifying questions, officers are not required to cease an interrogation until a suspect clearly requests an attorney.4 7
As with most decisions, the effect of Davis's holding will depend
upon the level of specificity at which it is stated. 8 While, by its terms,
Davis is inapplicable to ambiguous invocations of the right to remain
silent, the full reach of the opinion must be determined by reference
to both its text and rationale.4 9 A sterile extension of Davis, without
thoroughly consulting these interpretive guides, is not only an unseemly abandonment of judicial responsibility, but also an unjustifiable official imprimatur upon a needlessly abusive interrogation
practice, a practice designed to capitalize knowingly upon the fear,
intimidation, and linguistic limitations that render many individuals
unable to invoke "clearly" their rights. 5'
Respondent, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (No. 92-1949); see also 512
U.S. at 466-67 n.2 (Souter,J., concurring).
46
Davis, 512 U.S. at 461.
47 See id.
at 461-62.
Compare United States v. Andrade, 925 F. Supp. 71, 79 (D. Mass. 1996) ("Davis
addressed the question of how courts are to determine whether a person in custody
has invoked his right to counsel such that questioning of him must cease in accordance with the principle established in Edwards .. "),with United States v. Maisonneuve, 950 F. Supp. 1280, 1285 (D. Vt. 1996) ("In Davis... the Supreme Court addressed equivocal assertions of Fifth Amendment rights during custodial
interrogation.") (citation omitted).
49 Several courts have recognized that Davis does not explicitly govern
right-tosilence cases. See, e.g., Evans v. Domosthenes, 902 F. Supp. 1253, 1258 (D. Nev.
1995) (recognizing that "under Davis ....the right to counsel must be invoked unambiguously.... it is not clear whether the same is true of the right to remain silent") (citation and footnote omitted), affd, 98 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1996); State v.
Strayhand, 911 P.2d 577, 592 (Ariz. 1995) (stating that "Davis did not deal with the
Fifth Amendment guarantee against self incrimination

. . ."

and rejecting Davis in

the right-to-silence context).
See infra Part IV for an alternative approach to ambiguous invocations of the
right to silence.
51
Cf Brief for the Respondent at 14, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994)
(No. 92-1949) (stating that if police officers "continue interrogating a suspect, despite an ambiguous reference to counsel, they may be overriding the suspect's desire
to have counsel present simply because he has not made the request with sufficient
precision"). As Justice Souter observed in his concurring opinion in Davis, the
"margin of difference" between the Davis rule and one requiring clarification of ambiguities is defined by those instances in which clarifying questions would reveal that
a suspect actually intended to invoke his right. Davis, 512 U.S. at 474 (Souter, J.,
concurring). In this light, the Davis rule seems to rest on what Justice Brennan has
analogously termed "a fear of too much justice." McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's concern that accep-
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II. AMBIGUOUS INVOCATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT:
WHETHER TO APPLY DA VIS

Developing an appropriate approach to ambiguous or equivocal
invocations of the right to silence presupposes the disutility of the
Davis rule in this area of law. Yet, where the need for clarity is essential to guide law enforcement, and where substantive rights may be
lost in legal complexities, the appropriateness of developing new
rules must be justified, not merely presupposed. 2 This Part will,
therefore, analyze the propriety of departing from the Davis standard
and determine whether the Davis approach, while not developed in
the right-to-silence context, may nonetheless be effectively utilized in
this area of the law as well.
A. CustodialPolice InterrogationJurisprudence
Since Mirandawas decided in 1966, the Supreme Court has had
numerous occasions to develop the contours of the dual rights enunciated in that decision.53 In a series of cases, the Court has refined
the critical distinction between the right to counsel and the right to
remain silent. In so doing, the Court has expressly eschewed the
development of symmetrical standards to govern each right when
necessary to give effect to their distinct natures and purposes."
tance of the petitioner's racial bias evidence in imposing death penalty would "open
the door to widespread challenges to all aspects of criminal sentencing").
52 See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 688 (1988)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(observing that "the rule of Edwards [and Mosley are] our rule[s], not a constitutional command; and it is our obligation to justify [their] expansion").
55 Among the many interpretive and definitional
issues with which the Court has
grappled since its Miranda decision are (i) the definition of "custody"; see generally
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420
(1984); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S.
492 (1977); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976); Orozco v. Texas, 394
U.S. 324 (1969); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968); (ii) the definition of
"interrogation"; see generally Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990); Arizona v.
Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980); (iii)
whether a suspect has "reinitiated" conversation with the police after invoking his
Miranda rights; see generally Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983); and (iv) the
meaning of "scrupulously honoring" the right to remain silent; see generally Michigan
v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
See infra Parts II.A.1 and II.A.2.
55 The distinction was first made in Miranda itself, which stated
that if the accused "indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he
wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 473 (1966), and continued, "If the individual states that he wants an attorney,
the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." Id. at 474; see also Mosley,
423 U.S. at 104 n.10 (recognizing that Miranda "distinguished between the procedural safeguards triggered by a request to remain silent and a request for an attorney"). The Court has extended its practice of defining legal principles in relation to
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These distinctions make clear that the right to counsel and the right
to silence do not require identical treatment or analysis.
1. Police Interrogation and the Right to Remain Silent
In Michigan v. Mosley,56 the Court addressed a question left open
by Miranda: whether and under what circumstances a custodial suspect may be re-questioned at the initiation of police officers after he
has invoked his right to remain silent.57 In Mosley, a robbery suspect
was arrested and taken to a police precinct where he was then advised
of his Miranda rights and completed a rights notification certificateil
In response to custodial interrogation, the suspect stated that he did
not want to talk about the robberies and the interrogation immediately ceased. 9 The suspect was then brought to a cell block. Approximately two hours later, the suspect was moved from the cell
block for further questioning by a different officer regarding an unrelated murder.6 ' Following a fresh set of Mirandawarnings, and after again signing a rights notification form, the suspect made several
statements that implicated him in the unrelated murder. 2 The statements were introduced at trial following denial of a suppression motion. 63 The defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment.64 The Supreme
Court eventually granted certiorari
"because of the important consti65
tutional question presented.,

the purpose sought to be achieved beyond the context of the Fifth Amendment
privilege. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430-31 (1984) (recognizing that
"custody" for Miranda purposes is significantly more narrow than "custody" for federal habeas corpus purposes). See also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4
(1979) (commenting that "[t]he definitions of 'interrogation' under the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments ... are not necessarily interchangeable, since the policies underlying the two constitutional protections are quite distinct.").

423 U.S. 96 (1975).

See id. at 101. The Mosley court observed that "[Miranda] states that 'the interrogation must cease' when the person in custody indicates that 'he wishes to remain
silent.' It does not state under what circumstances, if any, a resumption of questioning is permissible." Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474); see also id. at 109 (White,
J., concurring) (commenting that "the statement in Miranda... requiring interrogation to cease after an assertion of the 'right to silence' tells us nothing because it
does not indicate how soon this interrogation may resume").
58 See id.
at 97.
59 See id.
57

60

61
62

63
6

See id.

See id. at 97-98.
See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 98.
See id. at 99.
See id.
Id. (describing the procedural history of the case).
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The Court first noted that, under Miranda, a suspect's right to
terminate custodial interrogation by invoking the right to remain silent does not, absent a request for counsel, indefinitely proscribe further questioning by any police officer on any subject.6 Rather, the
Court held that police may resume questioning if the right to remain
silent is "scrupulously honored."67 In light of these principles, the
Court further held that no violation of the right to remain silent occurred when a robbery suspect, in response to custodial interrogation, stated that he did not want to talk about the robberies, but was
approached by a second officer approximately two hours later, who
again advised the suspect of his Miranda rights and questioned the
suspect about an unrelated murder.'
While the precise test for
"scrupulously honoring" the right to remain silent continues to be
the subject of litigation in the lower federal courts,"" it is settled law
that the police are not prohibited from resuming interrogation of a
suspect who has once invoked his right to silence. °
2. Police Interrogation and the Right to Counsel
In contrast to Mosley and the right to remain silent, an accused's
invocation of the right to counsel triggers significantly different procedural safeguards. In Edwards v. Arizona," the Supreme Court considered whether, and under what circumstances, an accused who has
invoked his right to counsel in response to custodial interrogation,
may thereafter waive that right while still in custody." The Court first
observed that a waiver will not be established merely by showing that
the accused responded to police questioning. Rather, the Court
held, having invoked the right to counsel, any subsequent statements
obtained from the accused will be presumed coerced unless the suspect "initiated" conversation with the police and thereafter know-

66See id. at 102-03.
67 See id. at 103-04.
G8

See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104-05.

06 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 344 (2d ed.

1992) (explaining that courts do not unanimously agree on the essential elements of
the "scrupulously honor" test).
70 See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102-03; see also Stewart v. United States, 668 A.2d 857,
869 (D.C. 1995) (Farrell, J. concurring) (recognizing that "as applied uniformly by
the courts of appeals, the Mosley standard permits further interaction between the
police and the suspect and evaluates it case-by-case by applying multiple factors
gleaned from the Mosley decision").
71 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
7
See id at 484-85.
73 See id. at 484.
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ingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived the right to counsel.74 As a
corollary to that principle, the Edwards Court further held that an accused having expressed a desire to deal with the police only through
counsel is not subject to further interrogation until an attorney is
present or 75the accused himself initiates further communication with
the police.

Thus, unlike the Mosley rule in the right-to-silence con-

text, the Edwards rule in the right-to-counsel context clearly expresses
the temporal effect of invoking the right - police questioning must
cease until an attorney is present or the accused initiates conversation.
Subsequent cases have continued to build upon the Mosley/Edwards jurisprudential dichotomy. For example, while Mosley
indicated that a significant factor in determining the appropriateness
of resuming interrogation of a suspect who has invoked his right to
silence is whether the subject of the subsequent interrogation is different from the first, 76 this analysis has been specifically rejected in
the right-to-counsel context. In Arizona v. Roberson,7 the Court held
the Edwards rule, that an accused who has invoked his right to counsel is not subject to further questioning absent counsel's presence, to
be applicable where police-initiated questioning occurs in the context of different charges in a separate investigation. 78 The Court reasoned that "the presumption raised by a suspect's request for counsel - that he considers himself unable to deal with the pressures of
custodial interrogation without legal assistance - does not disappear
simply because the police have approached the suspect, still in custody, still without counsel, about a separate investigation."7 Accordingly, while in limited circumstances law enforcement authorities are
permitted to approach a suspect who has invoked his right to silence
and initiate further questioning in the absence of an attorney,
74
75

See id. at 485, 482.
See id. at 484-85; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966) (stating

that, once an accused indicates a desire to have an attorney, "the interrogation must

cease until an attorney is present"). A suspect "initiates" conversation when he
"evince [s] a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation." Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., plurality
opinion). The plurality view has since become the accepted standard for suspect
"initiations." See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 546 (1992) ("While the Court split 4-4 in Bradshaw as to the proper test
for initiation, the lower courts have consistently followed Justice Rehnquist's view.").
76 See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104-05; see also LAFAVE & ISRAEL,
supra note 69, at 344
(stating that some courts have found this factor "essential... to a finding that defendant's rights were 'scrupulously honored,' and there is much to be said for this
position").
77 486 U.S. 675
(1988).
See id at 682-83.
79 Id. at 683.
78
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"additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel." s° Interestingly, these "additional safeguards" appear to be precisely what lead the Court to its holding in Davis.8 '
The Davis majority seemed particularly concerned that requiring the cessation of questioning immediately upon an ambiguous or
equivocal reference to counsel would unjustifiably "extend Edwards.0 2 Absent that concern, there is little to suggest that the same
high standard for invocations should apply in the right-to-silence
context where procedural obstacles to custodial interrogation are
significantly less, and thus requiring police to yield in response to
ambiguity or equivocation is less likely to impede legitimate investigations.8 ' Ultimately, in light of the significant differences between
right to counsel and right-to-silence jurisprudence, the federal interest in maintaining the clarity essential to guide effectively law enforcement, while usually a significant concern, 4 cannot realistically
weigh against8 5formulating an invocation rule unique to the right to
remain silent.
80

Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484. As the discussion accompanying infra notes 120-24

indicates, the "additional safeguards" triggered by a request for counsel are a function of the presumption raised by a suspect's request that he needs legal advice,
rather than a conclusion that the right to counsel should be more stringently protected than the right to silence.
81

See infra Part II.B.1.

See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 461 (1994).
Contrary to this argument, some courts have reasoned that Davis should be
applied in the right-to-silence context because, since the right to counsel is accorded
greater procedural protection than the right to silence, and Davis's "clear invocation" rule applies to the right to counsel "by even greater logic," no more lenient
standard should apply to the right to silence. See, e.g., Evans v. Demosthenes, 902 F.
Supp. 1253, 1259 (D. Nev. 1995), affd, 98 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 1996); State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277, 284-85 (Minn. 1995). Despite the initial plausibility of this
argument, because the procedural rules designed to effectuate and protect the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination must be analyzed with reference to
the legal purposes sought to be achieved, rather than through syllogistic exercises,
the applicability of Davis's holding to the right to silence is best determined in the
context of the reasons that led the Court to its decision in Davis and the substantive
III.
and
II.B
Parts
and practical distinctions between the two rights. See infra
..
n
L
at
fr.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated the importance of maintaining clarity in the law of custodial interrogation "in order... to give concrete constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966); see also Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680 (1988)
(extolling the virtues of clarity in this area of law); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 430 (1984) (noting that "[o]ne of the principal advantages" of Miranda is its
clarity and ease of application);.
8- A further difficulty with rotely extending Davis beyond the factual context in
which it was decided is found in the constitutional and prudential considerations
behind the "standing" rules implicitly found in the "case or controversy" requirement applicable to Article III courts. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Lujan v. De94
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Yet, even while the need to promote clarity in the law of confessions does not require adherence to Davis in the right-to-silence context, whether the opinion's rationale nonetheless demonstrates the
propriety of extending it to this area as well requires analysis of the
reasons that led the Court to its holding.
B. The Davis Rationale and the Right to Remain Silent
Davis held that in order to provide a "bright line" rule essential
for effective law enforcement and to avoid transforming procedural
safeguards into "wholly irrational obstacles" to police investigations, a
suspect in custody and subject to police interrogation must invoke
the right to counsel "sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney."86 The dual purposes of maintaining a bright
line and avoiding irrational investigative obstacles seem equally applicable in the right-to-silence context, thus suggesting Davis's applicability. These purposes must be considered in light of the context
in which they were invoked.
1. "Irrational Obstacles"
Since Davis was clearly a right-to-counsel case, the procedural
safeguards of Edwards, rather than Mosley, stood to be triggered by
the Court's decision. 7 Recognizing this, the Court was clearly concerned with the potential investigative inefficiency of giving effect to
ambiguous references to counsel.88 The Court reasoned that in some
instances a suspect may ambiguously refer to an attorney without acfenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (recognizing that "the core component
of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III."). Standing requires that a potential plaintiff have suffered
'injury in fact' that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. See id. A primary purpose of the
standing requirement is to ensure that litigants have a sufficient interest in the putative case or controversy to motivate an aggressive and thorough prosecution of the
case, which in turn will aid in sharpening the issues for the courts' full consideration
of the case and the impact its decision will have. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 95 (2d ed. 1991). Since Davis was decided as a right-to-counsel
case, and neither the briefs nor oral argument before the Court considered the impact of the arguments in the right-to-silence context, there is a real concern that extending Davis beyond the context in which it was decided will result in ill-considered

precedent.
86 Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. The Court indicated that whether the accused actually
invoked counsel "is an objective inquiry." Id. at 458-59.
Compare Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482-83 (1981) (discussing right-tocounsel procedural safeguards), with Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-05 (1975)
(discussing right-to-silence procedural safeguards).
87

88

See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
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tually desiring a lawyer's presence."' Thus, a rule that required the
immediate cessation of questioning upon an ambiguous reference to
counsel would, in some instances, needlessly prevent officers from
interrogating suspects in the absence of counsel, even when a suspect
is willing to speak without an attorney.90 Such a rule, "would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity," according to the Court.9' The
Davis Court's reasoning in this regard clearly reflects the effect of
Edwards's procedural safeguards and, in light of the significant differences between Edwards and Mosley, indicates the appropriateness of
confining Davis's holding to the right-to-counsel context.
The perceived obstacle to police interrogations imposed by Edwards simply does not exist in the same degree under Mosley and the
right-to-silence context. Mosley made clear that a suspect who invokes
his right to silence in response to police questioning may again be
subject to police-initiated interrogation so long as authorities
"scrupulously honor" the suspect's choice. Thus, even presuming
that some suspects may ambiguously express reluctance to speak with
the police when they do not actually desire to invoke their right to
silence, a rule requiring the cessation of questioning immediately
upon an ambiguous or equivocal reference to the right to remain silent would not irrationally prevent police interrogation. Under Mosley and settled right-to-silence jurisprudence, officers are entitled to
reinitiate conversation with an accused who has invoked the right to
silence. 3 Thus, unlike a case controlled by Edwards, giving effect to a
suspect's ambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent would
not raise an irrational barrier to police investigations because clarification may later be sought, consistent with the accused's right to silence. The Davis Court's concern with creating an irrational obstacle
to police investigative activity is thus inapplicable in the right-tosilence context.
2. "Bright Lines"
Davis's second major concern - preserving Edwards's bright line
rule that once counsel is requested all interrogation must cease until
an attorney is present - is likewise inapplicable in the right-tosilence context for neither Edwards'sbright line, nor any equally per se
89
90

See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 460.
See id.

91

Id.

9

See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104.

9

See id.
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rule, apply in that context. 94 Moreover, the flexible "scrupulously
honor" standard, which permits reinterrogation of suspects who have
invoked their right to silence, would, in fact, complement application
of the clarification approach rejected in Davis and reduce the pressure on law enforcement initially to judge, on pain of suppression,
whether an accused invoked his right to silence.9 5
More fundamentally, the explanation for the per se aspects of the
Edwards rule is premised upon counsel's "'unique ability to protect
the Fifth Amendment rights of a client undergoing custodial interrogation."' By invoking the right to counsel, an accused "expresse[s]
his own view that he is not competent to deal with the authorities
without legal advice. 97 Yet, as Mosley made clear, an individual's decision to "cut off questioning" by invoking the right to remain silent
raises no such presumption that he is unable to deal competently
with the police without an attorney. 9 The Davis Court's concern with
preserving the bright line of Edwards, therefore, will not justify extending Davis's holding to the right-to-silence context. In sum, neither the language nor logic of the Davis opinion suggests the appropriateness of applying its holding in the right-to-silence context."
Courts faced with ambiguous invocations of the right to remain silent
are therefore not constrained to follow Davis's holding.

94 The "scrupulously honor" standard is the antithesis of a
bright line. To the
extent that it is a largely fact-specific, multi-pronged standard, the precise elements
of which lower federal courts continue to disagree on, it cannot be preserved as a
"briht line" in the right-to-silence context whether Davis applies there or not.
See infra Part IV.A.2.i.
96 Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681-82 n.4 (1988) (quoting Fare v. Michael
C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979)).
97 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 110 n.2 (1995) (White,
J., concurring); see
Roberson, 486 U.S. at 681-83.
98 See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 110 n.2 (White,
J., concurring); Roberson, 486 U.S. at
682-83.
See supra notes 49, 86-98 and accompanying text. But see Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that because the Davis concern
"applies with equal force to the invocation of the right to remain silent, and because
we have previously held that the same rule should apply in both contexts, we hold
that the Davis rule applies to invocations of the right to remain silent"); United
States v. Andrade, 925 F. Supp. 71, 79-80 (D. Mass. 1996) ("This court agrees.., that
the concern that lead to the [Davis] rule with respect to the invocation of the right
to counsel is not less significant in the case of an invocation of the right to remain
silent."). As the discussion in supra Part II.B and infra Part III demonstrates, these
cases rest on an overly narrow reading of the Davis Court's reasoning and an inappropriately superficial analysis of the issue subjudice.
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III. DEVELOPING AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO AMBIGUOUS
INVOCATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO SILENCE

Neither the federal interests in clarity and uniformity of law nor
the dual rationales of Davis requires adherence to the Davis standard
in the right-to-silence context.'00 Whether the rule of Davis is sufficiently incompatible with the right to silence to warrant departing
from Davis, however, warrants separate consideration. Accordingly,
this Part will consider the unique nature of the right to remain silent,
distinguish it from the right to counsel, and suggest that the significant differences between the-two rights justify departing from Davis
and developing an approach that is responsive to the distinctive quality of the right to remain silent.
A. Substantive Considerations
Unlike most rights, the right to remain silent must affirmatively
be invoked.' ' Frequently, as may be expected, a suspect's response
following Mirandawarnings will be sufficiently ambiguous such that
police officers do not know whether the individual intends to invoke
his rights or not.'02 While ambiguities may take the form of equivocal
or seemingly contradictory words or actions,' 5 some suspects will
simply remain mute and refuse to speak or gesture at all in response
to Miranda warnings and subsequent questioning. 4 Such conduct
:00 See supra Part II.A.
,0ISee supra note 14 and accompanying text.
02 See State v. Levya, 906 P.2d 894, 897 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("For a variety of
reasons, including poor command of the English language, and fear or intimidation,
defendants often respond in equivocal or ambiguous language when their Miranda
rights are explained."), affd in part, rev'd in part, 951 P.2d 738 (Utah 1997). A suspect's ambiguous reference to the right to silence may occur either directly in response to Mirandawarnings or later, following a waiver of Miranda rights. See Levya,
906 P.2d at 897-98 (recognizing a pre- and post-waiver distinction for purposes of
ambiguous invocations of Miranda rights). See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 79 F.3d
298, 303-04 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that there is no invocation of the right to silence
if, following waiver of Miranda rights, suspect ambiguously answered some questions
and refused to answer others); United States v. Ramsey, 992 F.2d 301, 303 (11th Cir.
1993) (explaining that following Miranda warnings and officer's question of whether
he wanted to make a statement, the suspect ambiguously responded by looking at
the officer and looking away).
103See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062, 1067, 1069 (6th Cir. 1994)
(holding that no right to counsel is invoked if, in response to a third reading of Miranda warnings, the suspect stated that "it would be nice" to have an attorney present); Henry v. State, 462 S.E.2d 737, 742 (Ga. 1995) (noting that, in response to the
question of whether he wanted an attorney, the suspect stated "I might need one. If
I need one.").
104 See, e.g., United States v. Montana, 958 F.2d 516, 517
(2d Cir. 1992) (after receiving Miranda warnings, suspect refused to respond to routine booking questions
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thus raises the question of whether the silence itself was intended to
invoke the suspect's right to remain silent. 10 5 As one pro se criminal
defendant argued in Evans v. Demosthenes,"6 "[my] refusal to answer
any of the officer's questions was an obvious invocation of that right
and any objective observer would have drawn that conclusion."'0 7
This problem is compounded by the fact that, unlike the parallel
right to counsel, suspects who remain mute in response to Miranda
warnings and subsequent police questioning may simply believe that
they are exercising the right to silence, about which they were just informed, without realizing their obligation to invoke affirmatively the
right prior to exercising it.'00 For these individuals, in light of the
significant body of case law holding such silence to be at best ambiguous,'09 application of Davis will more often than not deny them
the ability to "cut off questioning" - the essence of the right to remain silent"0 - because their silence will not be "a clear assertion of
thereby invoking right to silence); United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1475 (9th
Cir. 1988) (suspect remained silent throughout ten minutes of interrogation after
receiving Mirandawarnings).
105
See State v. Ross, 552 N.W.2d 428, 432 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) ("Indeed,
a suspect
could theoretically attempt to invoke his or her right to silence by remaining stone
silent in the face of police questioning.").
106 902 F. Supp. 1253, 1257 (D. Nev. 1995), aff'd, 98 F.3d
1174 (9th Cir. 1996).
107 Demosthenes, 902 F. Supp. at 1257 (quoting
defendant/appellant's brief to the
court of appeals which remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration in
light of cases holding that silence in the face of ten minutes of interrogation was sufficient to invoke the right to remain silent); see Ross, 552 N.W.2d at 429 (noting that
a suspect who remained silent following Miranda warnings argued that his silence
was an invocation of the right to remain silent); see also infra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing pre-Daviscases holding silence in the face of interrogation was
an invocation of the right to remain silent).
108 This problem, unique to the right-to-silence context, does not arise
in the
right-to-counsel context where few, if any, suspects should expect that by remaining
silent the police would understand their silence as an exercise of the right to counsel.
M See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 992 F.2d 301, 305 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding
that the defendant equivocally invoked right to silence when, in response to the officer's inquiry of whether the defendant wanted to make a statement, the defendant
looked at officer and looked away); People v. Cohen, 226 A.D.2d 903, 904 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1996) (holding that "[d]efendant's silence after responding to questions for 30
minutes was ambiguous conduct" that was insufficient to invoke the right to remain
silent); Ross, 552 N.W.2d at 432 (applying the Davis standard and concluding that "a
suspect's silence, standing alone, is insufficient to invoke unambiguously the right to
remain silent."); People v. Cooper, 731 P.2d 781, 784 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (stating
that "a defendant's silence, without more, is insufficient to require the police to discontinue questioning").
110 See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 100-01 (1975) ("'Without the right to cut
off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to
overcome [his] free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been
once invoked."') (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966)); United
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the right."' Extension of Davis to the right to silence will therefore
result in effectively denying many suspects the reprieve from police
interrogation to which they are entitled, while failing simultaneously
to advance any legitimate governmental or law enforcement interest. 12 While confessions undoubtedly are essential to the continued
effectiveness of law enforcement,1 the government has no legitimate
interest in maintaining a system of criminal justice that relies for its
effectiveness on ignoring citizens' attempts to invoke their constitutional rights. 114 The unique nature of the right to silence in this regard justifies departure from Davis and a rule that is responsive to the
distinctive concerns raised by ambiguity in this area.
In addition, the right to remain silent is on greater constitutional footing than the Miranda right to counsel and thus arguably
warrants a more flexible rule regarding invocations. 115 Because the
right to refuse to provide testimonial information when under com-1
pulsion to do so is the essence of the Fifth Amendment privilege, 6
invocations of the right to remain silent may more properly be governed by the usual presumption against waiver of constitutional
rights "' than the Mirandaright to counsel, which is at least one layer
of prophylaxis removed from the Fifth Amendment privilege." 8 In
States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947, 955 (8th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that "[a] person's
'right to cut off questioning' is central to the Fifth Amendment, and this right must
be 'scrupulously honored."') (quoting Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103).
::
13

Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994).
See
note
114 and accompanying
See infra
Moran
v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412, text.
427 (1986) (recognizing "society's legiti-

mate and substantial interest in securing admissions of guilt"); United States v.
Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977) (recognizing that "admissions of guilt by
wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently desirable").
114

See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964) ("If the exercise of constitu-

tional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there
is something very wrong with that system.").
15

Cf State v. Strayhand, 911 P.2d 577, 592 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that

Davis arguably "undercuts" Arizona's rule of clarification in the right-to-silence context "although Davis did not deal with the Fifth Amendment guarantee against selfincrimination").
16 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
761 (1966) (stating that the privi-

lege against self-incrimination "protects an accused only from being compelled to
testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial
or communicative nature."); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 590-600 (1990)
(recognizing and applying distinction between compelling production of testimonial

and 7physical evidence for purposes of privilege against self-incrimination).
I See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979); Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (stating that "courts indulge in every reasonable presumption
against waiver" of constitutional rights); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
475 (1966).
18 The right to counsel recognized in Miranda
has the limited purpose of protecting the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during custodial
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fact, this substantive distinction between the rights to counsel and silence would explain the apparent disharmony, recognized by some
commentators, between the Court's decision in Davis and the longstanding presumption against finding a waiver." 9
While it may be argued that recognizing a more flexible standard for invoking the right to silence than the right to counsel would
be inconsistent with the Court's practice of erecting more stringent
procedural protections around the right to counsel, the argument
fails to recognize that procedural safeguards designed to protect the
privilege against self-incrimination are justified by reference to their
prophylactic purpose. 2 ' The reason why a suspect who invokes the
right to counsel is not subject to police questioning absent counsel's
presence is that the request raises an irrebuttable presumption of the
suspect's need for legal advice. 22 No such presumption is raised by
the invocation of the right to remain silent.

23

The prophylactic pro-

scription against reinterrogation in a right-to-counsel case is thus best
explained by the need to ensure that a suspect's right to rely on
counsel's "unique ability to protect... Fifth Amendment rights" is
not jeopardized,' 24 rather than an unarticulated per se rule that rightto-counsel standards must always be more stringent than right-tosilence standards.

interrogation. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-70; Faulkner, supra note 19, at 288-89.
The right to remain silent, on the other hand, is the core value of the Fifth Amendment privilege. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469-70. This is not to argue, however, that
the right to remain silent, as interpreted in Miranda, does not itself have prophylactic characteristics attributable more to Miranda than the Fifth Amendment. For example, by presuming the existence of government "compulsion" necessary to trigger
the Fifth Amendment privilege, Miranda applies the right to remain silent broader
than the Fifth Amendment alone would warrant. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S 298,
304-06 (1985) (explaining that the Miranda exclusionary rule reaches statements
that the Fifth Amendment itself would not because compulsion is presumed under
Miranda). This, however does not alter the conclusion that between the two rights
recognized in Miranda, the right to silence is considerably more constitutionally
supportable by the Fifth Amendment than the right to counsel.
See generallyJonathan B. Bruno, Comment, Davis v. United States: Leaving Less
Articulate Suspects to Fend for Themselves in the Face of Custodial Interrogation, 22 NEW
ENG.J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 29 (1996).
:20 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 83.
2
See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987).
122 See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683 (1988).
123 See id.
124 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979); see Roberson, 486 U.S. at 682-83
n.4.
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B. PracticalConsiderations
In addition to these substantive concerns, considered from the
perspective of the suspect, a significant practical concern, from the
view of law enforcement, further highlights the need for distinctive
rules in these two areas of law. A suspect's invocation of Miranda
rights imposes significant obligations on police officers involved in
the investigation.12 5 The scope of the duty thus created is dependent
upon the right which is invoked.12 6 If an individual invokes the right
to silence, the police must "scrupulously honor" that decision and
immediately cut off questioning.2 This duty is a passive obligation in
2 8
that it requires the cessation, if only temporary, of an interrogation.
Compliance is easily accomplished; and because reinterrogation is
still permissible, does not necessarily jeopardize the success of an investigation.
On the other hand, if an individual invokes the right to counsel,
a significantly more affirmative obligation is imposed upon the police. Not only must all questioning immediately cease, but the suspect must also be provided with an attorney.ln This duty to provide
counsel is not nearly as easily accomplished and has a higher potential to stymie an investigation. 30 The greater procedural and affirmative obligations imposed upon police when an accused asks for counsel thus translate into a corresponding greater need on the part of
:25 See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
:26 See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
7
128

See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
The passage of time approved in Mosley was approximately two hours, which

the Court characterized as a "significant period." See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S.
96, 104, 106 (1975). On the other hand, two minutes has been held insufficient. See
Charles v. Smith, 894 F.2d 718, 726 (5th Cir. 1990).
12
See supra Part II.A.2. While the Mirandacourt stated that "[i]f authorities conclude that they will not provide counsel during a reasonable period of time in which
investigation in the field is carried out, they may refrain from doing so without violating the person's Fifth Amendment privilege so long as they do not question him
during that time," there is no question that the police must secure counsel for the
individual who invokes his right. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966).
1o See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949), in whichJusticeJackson
stated:
To subject one without counsel to questioning which may and is intended to convict him, is a real peril to individual freedom. To bring
in a lawyer means a real peril to solution of the crime, because, under
our adversary system, he deems that his sole duty is to protect his client - guilty or innocent - and that in such capacity he owes no duty
whatever to help society solve its crime problem. Under this conception of criminal procedure, any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any
circumstances.
Id. (Jackson,J., concurring).
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the police to know whether a suspect has invoked the right. The
Davis standard is arguably suited to that purpose. 3' Yet, in the rightto-silence context, no such heightened need to ensure the suspect's
wishes is present. If faced with an ambiguous indication of a desire
to remain silent, and thus the uncertainty of whether a duty has been
triggered, police may simply temporarily refrain from further questioning and later return to resume the interrogation consistent with
Mosley. By so doing, the police will have insulated themselves from
the specter of suppression by discharging their duty, in the event one
was created, while not permanently abandoning an interrogation, in
the event one was not. 32 In sum, different invocation standards in
the right-to-silence and right-to-counsel contexts can be justified by
reference to the varying duties that each right imposes upon the po3
lice. 3
By relating the burden imposed upon law enforcement to the clarity with
which a suspect must invoke his right, this argument implicitly tracks the analytic
approach taken by the Davis Court. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459-61
(1994) (reasoning that in the absence of a "clear" invocation of right to counsel, police may be hampered, through the threat of suppression and needlessly lost interrogation opportunities, from gathering information regarding crime under investigation).
132 Moreover, as the discussion in Part IV demonstrates, the
proposed definition
of a "clear invocation," in the presence of which all questioning must immediately
cease, combined with a clarification mandate, should largely eliminate the uncertainty of whether a duty has been triggered by a suspect's response.
133 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. An additional
practical distinction
relates to the methods by which suspects will foreseeably attempt to invoke the rights
to counsel and silence. Ordinarily the right to counsel will only be invoked by a verbal or written assertion. See State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277, 283 (Minn. 1995).
Attempts to invoke the right to silence, on the other hand, may be made by words
(oral or written), actions, or inaction. See, e.g., United States v. Andrade, 925 F.
Supp. 71, 80 (D. Mass. 1996) (describing the defendant as a suspect who remained
silent and in response to further questioning gave the police "a dismissive gesture");
United States v. Boyce, 594 F.2d 1246, 1250 (9th Cir. 1979) (recognizing that
"[u]nder some circumstances, declining to sign a Miranda waiver form will be an assertion of the right to silence .... ). Recognition of this fact puts the police on notice that even nonverbal conduct should be scrutinized to discern whether a suspect's behavior could reasonably be interpreted as indicative of an intent to invoke
the right to remain silent. Because police officers are trained to observe suspects'
conduct and draw inferences therefrom, this should not impose an undue burden
on law enforcement. See Wayne D. Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance:
Resurrecting the Warrant Requirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. ScH.J. HUM. RTs.
531, 586 (1997) (arguing in the Fourth Amendment context that a rule that
"demand[s] no more of law enforcement officers than what they are capable of providing" is not burdensome to the police). The variety of methods with which the
right to silence may be invoked, the predictability of many thereof, and the realization that careful scrutiny of suspects' behavior lies at the heart of a police officer's
skill and training all counsel in favor of a less stringent standard for invocations of
the right to silence than Davis provides.
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IV. THE PROPOSED APPROACH

The prior discussion has considered the separate though related
questions of whether either the jurisprudential or substantive and
practical differences between the rights to counsel and silence advise
courts to follow Davis in the right to remain silent context.1 3 4 Having
resolved each inquiry against extending Davis, this Part will propose
an alternative approach to ambiguous invocations of the right to remain silent that is responsive both to the unique nature of the right
and the traditional law enforcement reliance on confessions in order
effectively to interdict crime.
A. Invoking the Right to Silence
Under the proposed approach, a suspect would be held to have
invoked the right to remain silent by any words or actions,'35 including a refusal to answer questions, that could reasonably be interpreted by the police as intended to invoke the right to silence.'3 6 If a
suspect's behavior meets this threshold, then an invocation of the
right to silence will be presumed as a matter of law, the general interrogation must immediately cease, and the scope and immediacy of
any subsequent questioning will be determined by reference to
whether the individual's invocation was "clear" or "ambiguous." This
standard hews closely, though not identically, to the Court's only two
prior decisions to have specifically addressed the degree of clarity

See supra Parts II and III.
See Kappos v. Hanks, 54 F.3d 365, 369 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that "[a] voiced
refusal to cooperate or acts indicating such a refusal are the equivalent of invoking
the right of silence"); Boyce, 594 F.2d at 1250 (noting that "[u]nder some circumstances, declining to sign a Miranda waiver form will be an assertion of the right to
:34
5

silence .

. . .");

Brooks v. State, 229 A.2d 833, 836 (Del. 1967) (recognizing that "a

desire to terminate questioning may be shown in some manner other than express
language"); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966) ("If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he
wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.").
136 This definition builds upon
the Court's holdings in the companion cases of
Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) and Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190
(1955). See infra text accompanying notes 138-45. In the custodial interrogation
context, see Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1040 (1983) (plurality opinion),
which addressed the issue whether a suspect's ambiguous question "[w]ell, what is
going to happen to me now?" was sufficient to initiate further discussion with the
police within the meaning of Edwards. See id. Concluding that the question was ambiguous, but "could reasonably have been interpreted by the officer" as reinitiating a
discussion of the subject of the interrogation, the Court held the statement sufficient
to permit a resumption of questioning. Id. at 1045-46.
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with which the privilege against self-incrimination must be in3 7 and Emspak
voked - Quinn v. United States"
v. United States.'8
In Quinn and Emspak the Court addressed the issue of whether a
witness's statement in response to questions from a subcommittee of
the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives was sufficiently clear to invoke the privilege against selfincrimination. 1 9 The Court first reaffirmed the rule that "no ritualistic formula or talismanic phrase is essential in order to invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination." The court then held that in order to invoke the privilege, "[a]ll that is necessary is an objection
stated in language that a committee may reasonably be expected to understand as an attempt to invoke the privilege."040 The proposed standard is
consistent with this broad approach.
1. Clarity and Ambiguity
An invocation is "clear" if it leaves "no reasonable doubt" of the
suspect's intent to invoke the right to remain silent.14 ' If an individual has clearly invoked the right to silence, he has expressed his desire to cut off questioning and further interrogation may only be resumed after the suspect's decision has been "scrupulously

137349

U.S. 155 (1955).

349 U.S. 190 (1955). Neither the courts nor commentators seem to have
addressed the relevance of these cases to the issue subjudice.
139 See Quinn, 349 U.S. at 162; Emspak, 349 U.S. at 191-93.
In Quinn, the witness
refused to answer questions designed to elicit his affiliation, if any, with the Communist Party, based "on 'the first and fifth amendments' as well as 'the first amendment to the United States Constitution, supplemented by the fifth amendment."'
See Quinn, 349 U.S. at 157-58. In Emspak, the witness refused to answer similarly designed questions based on "primarily the first amendment, supplemented by the
fifth." See Emspak, 349 U.S. at 193-94.
14
Emspak, 349 U.S. at 194 (emphasis added); see Quinn, 349 U.S. at 162-63.
The
proposed approach differs from this standard in that the proposed approach does
not require an individual necessarily to use "language" to invoke the right to remain
silent as the Quinn/Emspak standard apparently does. See supra text accompanying
notes 135-36 (including "a refusal to answer questions" among the permissible
methods of invoking the right to silence).
141 Cf Quinn, 349 U.S. at 164 ("When
a witness declines to answer a question because of constitutional objections and the language used is not free from doubt, the
way is always open ... to inquire into the nature of the claim before making a ruling."); State v. Farley, 452 S.E.2d 50, 59 (W. Va. 1994) ("We believe that under Davis
insubstantial and trivial doubt, reasonably caused by the defendant's ambiguous
statements as to whether he wants the interrogation to end, should be resolved in
favor of the police ....
"). For a different formulation of a "clear" invocation, see
Florida v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 722 (Fla. 1997) (Shaw, J., concurring) ("In my view,
a suspect 'clearly' invokes the right to cut off questioning when a reasonable person
would conclude that the suspect has evinced a desire to stop the interview.").
1
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honored.' 42 In determining whether a "clear" invocation has been
made, courts should look not only to the words used (if any), but as
well to the circumstances leading to the suspect's response and the
context in which it is given.14 3 In making this inquiry, an accused's
post-invocation statements will be inadmissible to "cast retrospective
doubt" on the clarity of the initial invocation.' *4 In the absence of
such a rule, the authorities may be motivated to ignore an initial response with the purpose of manufacturing an ambiguity through further illicit colloquy.
On the other hand, an invocation is ambiguous if it meets the
threshold definition of "invocation," but nonetheless leaves the police "reasonably uncertain" whether the suspect intended to invoke
the right to silence.'45 If an individual makes an ambiguous invoca,42See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975); supra Part II.A. 1.
'4 See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984) (per
curiam) (indicating

that in
determining whether a request for counsel is ambiguous, both the request and the
circumstances leading to the request should be analyzed); United States v. Johnson,
56 F.3d 947, 955 (8th Cir. 1995) ("We consider the defendant's statements as a
whole to determine whether they indicate an unequivocal decision to invoke the
right to remain silent."); see also Owen, 696 So. 2d at 722 (stating that "[a]ll the circumstances surrounding the statement - including the suspect's schooling, command of English, and ethnic background - should be considered" in determining
whether a response is a clear invocation of the right to silence). Because of the significant potential for suspects to confuse the need to invoke the right to silence with
the actual exercise thereof, see supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text, a persistent refusal to speak in the face of interrogation under circumstances indicating that
the accused is aware of the questions being put to him, would be a significant factor
indicating that the individual has "clearly" invoked his right to silence. Cf United
States v. Montana, 958 F.2d 516, 518 (2d Cir. 1992) ("After receiving a Miranda
warning, a defendant's silence in the face of repeated questioning has been held sufficient to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege ....). This aspect of the proposed
approach should not significantly diminish the bright line character of the "clear"
invocation definition in light of experience that reveals that the police may typically
view such persistent silence as an invocation of the privilege. See id. The Federal
Rules of Evidence also recognize that under certain circumstances, nonverbal conduct can be equivalent to a "statement" when intended by a declarant to be assertive.
See FED. R. EvID. 801(a) (defining "statement" to include "nonverbal conduct of a
person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.").
144 See Smith, 469 U.S. at 100 (holding in the right-to-counsel
context that "an accused's postrequest responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request [for counsel]"); Campaneria v.
Reid, 891 F.2d 1014, 1022 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that "statements made in response
to questions after a suspect has invoked his right to remain silent cannot be used to
raise doubts about his initial invocation").
145The complete proposed definition of an "ambiguous invocation" of the right
to remain silent, therefore is, "any words or actions, including a refusal to answer
questions, that could reasonably be interpreted by the police as intended to invoke
the right to silence, but which nonetheless leave the police reasonably uncertain
whether the suspect intended to invoke the right to silence." See supra text accompanying notes 135-36. In the right-to-counsel context, Davis failed to define an
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tion of the right to silence, the general interrogation must immediately cease and the scope of further questioning must be strictly limited to clarifying the suspect's response.'4 If during the clarification
process, the individual "clearly" invokes his right to silence, all questioning must immediately cease and the right must be "scrupulously
honored." Likewise, if clarifying questions reveal that the ambiguity
"ambiguous" invocation because of its holding that, for constitutional purposes,
there is either a "clear" invocation or no invocation. See Davis v. United States, 512
U.S. 452, 458-61 (1994). Because the proposed approach attaches constitutional (or
at least enforceable prophylactic) significance to an "ambiguous" request, definition
is necessary. The proposed definition was developed in light of various pre-Davis
circuit court formulations developed in the right-to-counsel context. See, e.g., United
States v. March, 999 F.2d 456, 461 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that an ambiguous invocation is made "whenever a suspect makes a statement or asks a question that appears to contemplate invocation of his right to counsel."), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 983
(1993); Towne v. Dugger, 899 F.2d 1104, 1109 (lth Cir. 1990) (stating that an
"equivocal request" for counsel is "an ambiguous statement, either in the form of an
assertion or a question, communicating a possible desire to exercise [the] right to
have an attorney present during questioning"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 991 (1990);
United States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d 971, 975 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Equivocal statement[s]
that arguably can be construed as... request[s] for counsel" are ambiguous invocations); Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513, 517 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding an ambiguous invocation of right to counsel where the suspect "expresses both a desire for counsel
and a desire to continue the interview without counsel"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981
(1979); see also State v. Levya, 906 P.2d 894, 899 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (stating that
an "arguably equivocal" statement is sufficient to invoke the right to silence and that
"arguably equivocal 'indicates that defendant need only show that it is open to argument that one of the meanings of [the defendant's] statement was desire to terminate questioning"') (quoting State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 902 (Utah Ct. App.
1993)) (brackets in original).
1
Like the definition of "invocation," see supra text accompanying notes 135-36,
145, this element of the proposed approach also finds support in the Court's decisions in Quinn and Emspak, in which the Court stated that "a [congressional] committee is not obliged to either accept or reject an ambiguous constitutional claim
the very moment it is first presented. The way is always open for the committee to
inquire into the nature of the claim before making a ruling." Emspak v. United
States, 349 U.S. 190, 195 (1955). In the custodial interrogation context, see State v.
Strayhand, 911 P.2d 577, 592 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting Davis in the right-tosilence context and reaffirming the rule, under state law, that "'[e]ven if the defendant's assertion is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the limit of permissible continuing interrogation immediately after the assertion would be for the sole
purpose of ascertaining whether the defendant intended to invoke his right to silence, or to waive this right."') (quoting State v. Finehout, 665 P.2d 570, 573 (Ariz.
1983)). In the right-to-counsel context, prior to Davis, the clarification approach to
ambiguous invocations had been adopted by a significant majority of federal courts.
See, e.g., Porter v. United States, 776 F.2d 370, 370 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v.
Gotay, 844 F.2d 971, 975 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Riggs, 537 U.S. 1219, 1222
(4th Cir. 1976); Thompson v. Wainright, 601 F.2d 768, 771 (5th Cir. 1979); Nash v.
Estelle, 597 F.2d 513, 517 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Neilsen, 392 F.2d 849, 853
(7th Cir. 1968); United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1985);
United States v. March, 999 F.2d 456, 461 (10th Cir. 1993); Towne v. Dugger, 899
F.2d 1104, 1107 (1lth Cir. 1990).
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was not intended to invoke the right, then a general interrogation
may resume. In any event, because the individual has presumptively
invoked the right to silence, statements obtained during the clarifica47
of guilt.
tion process will be inadmissible as substantive evidence

The proposed approach has a number of distinct advantages over the
Davis rule and is likely to be preferred by both law enforcement officers and suspects who have
been thrust into the unpleasant thicket of
1 48
custodial interrogation.

2. Arguments in Favor
i. Reasonable Accommodation
Under the proposed approach, if a suspect makes an ambiguous
invocation of the right to silence, the scope of further questioning is
immediatelyr" narrowed
to clarifying the suspect's intent.149 With
1
150
proper safeguards, this rule occupies a reasonable middle ground
between allowing the slightest hesitation by a custodial suspect to inhibit an investigation and denying to all but the most articulate the
right to cut off questioning.' 5'
The inherently compelling pressures of custodial interrogation
are by now well documented. 2 Both the interrogation atmosphere
147 See Gotay, 844 F.2d at 975. Pre-Davis courts applying a clarification
approach
to ambiguous requests for counsel uniformly held that police may not use statements obtained after an equivocal request and before the ambiguity has been clarified. See, e.g., Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 771 (5th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Pena, 897 F.2d 1075, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990); Towne v. Dugger, 899 F.2d
1104, 1107-08 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 991 (1990). The clarification
process should not, however, be held to create a safe haven for suspects who
"volunteer" completely nonresponsive statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, after ambiguously invoking the right to silence and prior to clarifying the ambiguity.
48 See Brief of Amici Curiae of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement,
Inc.,
Joined by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., The National District Attorneys Association, Inc., and The National Sheriffs' Association In Support
of the Respondent at 5, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (No. 92-1949)
(urging the Court to adopt a clarification rule in the context of ambiguous comments regarding counsel as a "common sense" method of "accomodat[ing] the
rights of the subject, while at the same time preserv[ing] the interests of law enforcement and of the public welfare."); see also infra notes 176-82 and accompanying
text (explaining likely benefits to accused of a broad definition of invocation and
rule requiring clarification).
:49 See supra Part IV.A. 1.
50 For a discussion of the potential for abuse in the clarification process
and
proposed guidelines designed to prevent it, see infra Part IV.B.
.9 See Gotay, 844 F.2d at 975 ("Suspects should not be forced, on pain of losing a
constitutional right, to select their words with lawyer-like precision ... .
152 See supra note
4.
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and the questioning itself are designed to "trade[] on the weakness
of individuals.', 53 It is not only the "subnormal or woefully ignorant"
who fall prey to coercive police tactics. 5 4 The union of these factors
demonstrates that ambiguity and equivocation in response to police
questioning is typically not only foreseeable, but predictable. In light
of this reality, the proposed approach gives effect to any response
that the police could reasonably interpret as intending to invoke the
right to silence. This standard preserves the rights of custodial suspects who intend to invoke their right but are unable to do so with
the degree of clarity preferred by those in charge of the investigation.
From the law enforcement perspective, however, the definition
of "invocation" might seem overbroad. By reaching any response
which "could reasonably be interpreted as an invocation," the proposed standard will surely affect interrogations where suspects do not
actually intend to cut off questioning. The rule, it may be argued,
would thus create the precise investigative inefficiency which concerned the Davis Court in the right-to-counsel context, and is therefore subject to the same criticism - that it "unduly hamper[s] the
gathering of information.' 55 While similar reasoning has apparently
convinced some courts to adopt the Davis rule in the right-to-silence
context, 56 the argument is ultimately meritless because it ignores
both the flexibility of the "scrupulously honor" approach, not found

155
154

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966).
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 469 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring). Jus-

tice Souter stated that "[a] substantial percentage of [criminal suspect's] lack anything like a confident command of the English language.... many are 'woefully ignorant,' ... and many more will be sufficiently intimidated by the interrogation
process or overwhelmed by the uncertainty of their predicament that the ability to
speak assertively will abandon them." Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468)
(citations omitted). For many individuals subjected to custodial interrogation, the
ability to invoke assertively their rights will further be hampered by an uncertainty of
what the Mirandawarnings mean. According to one study of suspects' understanding of the Mirandawarnings:
The warning of the suspect's right to silence was equally confounding. Several believed it meant they had a right to talk; some believed they had been told they would not be allowed to talk. One suspect said it meant he "should have the right to say something so they
can use it in evidence in court," and another said it meant that "if
I... like try to bribe them, they would use it against me in court."
LvABAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 180 (1983) (ellipsis in original).
155 Davis, 512 U.S.
at 461.
156 See United States v. Andrade, 925 F. Supp. 71, 79-80
(D. Mass. 1996) (stating
that the Davis Court's concerns apply equally in the right-to-silence context); Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that the concerns of
the Davis Court "appl[y] with equal force to the invocation of the right to remain
silent").
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in the Edwards bright line, and the obvious benefits to be gained by
permitting clarification.
The proposed standard will unquestionably affect some interrogations where the suspect, by his ambiguous response, did not actually intend to cut off questioning. The critical distinction, however,
between a right-to-counsel case governed by Edwards and a right-tosilence case governed by Mosley, is the "effect" of such overbreadth on
the ability of police to gather information. Under Edwards, "the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present," while under MosLey, questioning may be resumed if the right has been "scrupulously
honored." Because in a right-to-silence case "invocation" does not
indefinitely suspend all interrogation, the relation between the definition of "invocation" and the potential for investigative inefficiency
is significantly more attenuated. A suspect who is unwittingly treated
as having invoked his right to silence under the proposed definition,
yet who did not intend to cut off questioning, may again be subject to
interrogation once the right has been "scrupulously honored." 57
Thus, any perceived inefficiency of the proposed definition is illusory
because the police will not indefinitely be prevented from interrogating such a suspect.
Moreover, whatever inefficiency would flow from presuming
ambiguities to be invocations would clearly be offset by the subsequent clarification permitted under the proposed approach. By
permitting narrow questions, strictly limited to clarifying the suspect's ambiguity, clarification can both reveal and remedy any
"harmless error" effected through incorrectly attributing an invocation to a suspect whose ambiguous response was not actually intended to invoke his right. The proposed approach will thus extend
the "right to cut off questioning" to even the woefully inarticulate
who desire it, while providing the clarification mechanism to identify
more particularly those who do not. By preserving individual rights
without compromising law enforcement interests, clarification is "the
intuitively sensible course.,58
157

Besides, as was noted in the right-to-counsel context, see supra note 43, the

concern that a suspect who actually desires to speak with the police will be prevented
from doing so because his ambiguity is presumptively treated as an invocation of the
right to silence is specious at best. The law is well settled that an individual, whether
in custody or not, may volunteer information to the police if she freely chooses to do
so. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 (noting that suspects in custody may volunteer
statements to the police).
1
Davis, 512 U.S. at 473 (Souter,J., concurring). While clarification in the rightto-counsel context could likewise eliminate the inefficiency of giving effect to ambiguous counsel references where the suspect did not actually desire an attorney's
presence, the Davis Court rejected the suggestion in favor of preserving the Edwards
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ii. Bright Lines
A significant feature of the proposed approach is its clearly defined standards for guiding police officers in ascertaining their obligations consistent with the Fifth Amendment privilege. Under the
proposed definition of invocation, only if a suspect's response could
not reasonably be interpreted as indicating an intent to cut off questioning will the police be justified in ignoring the response and proceeding with a general interrogation.'5 9 If the officer has "any reasonable doubt," he should clarify the suspect's intent. At this point,
the officer is entitled to dispel his reasonable doubt through questions narrowly confined to clarifying the individual's response.160
Only when the individual has "clearly" expressed a desire to cut off
questioning must the clarifying questions cease. 16 1 Since a "clear" invocation is defined as one leaving "no reasonable doubt" of the suspect's intent, this standard provides a bright guiding line for police
during the interrogation process. This combination of bright lines
and flexibility "relieves the police officer of the need to speculate
about the suspect's wishes" 62 and thus responds to one of the chief
concerns of the Davis Court - the loss of evidence through suppression where officers have "guessed" wrong. '6 Rather than invite the
"difficult judgment calls" which, if subsequently overruled by a court,
would require suppression of any statements directly obtained as a
result,' 64 the proposed approach sensibly permits the police to ascertain the suspect's wishes and thereby dispel whatever uncertainty exists. As one commentator has recognized, such "clarification efforts

bright line. See id. at 459-62. The concern that lead the Court to reject a clarification rule in Davis is thus not present in the right-to-silence context, where the Edwards bright line is inapplicable.
:59 See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
60 For a discussion of proposed guidelines to aid the implementation
of the clarification process, see infra Part IV.B.
61 See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
62 Brief for the United States at 24, Davis v. United States, 512
U.S. 452 (1994)
(No. 92-1949).
163 See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461 (articulating concern to
avoid forcing police officers
to "make difficult judgment calls about whether the suspect in fact wants a lawyer.., with the threat of suppression if they guess wrong").
I

See id.Statements obtained in violation of Miranda may not be used as sub-

stantive evidence against the defendant at trial. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 479 (1966) (stating the suppression rule applied both to the right to counsel
and to the right to silence); see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981)
(stating the suppression rule in the context of the right to counsel); Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (stating rule of suppression in context of right to
remain silent).
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will more often than not settle matters - and settle them correctly."'65
Yet, even where matters are not so easily settled, clarification
may still reduce the chance of suppression by resulting in a more
fully developed record of the station house exchange between the
police and the suspect.'6 A more complete record of the essential issues (e.g., what statements were made, and what were the circumstances in which they were made?) will reduce the number of confessions lost through suppression in two ways. First, a well-developed
record may dissuade some defendants from pursuing a suppression
motion. 167 Second, where such motions are made, the record will facilitate the government's burden of proof on the critical issues of invocation and waiver.'68
While the proposed clarification approach seems intuitively reasonable,'6 it has also been associated with several perceived dangers.
Most particularly, the risk that further questioning following an ambiguous invocation will "shade subtly into illicit[] badgering" 76 warrants analysis of the potential perils of clarification and whether appropriate guidelines may be established to dispel the potential risks.
B. Arguments Against Clarificationand Proposed Guidelines
Despite the immediate appeal of the proposed approach in the
right to remain silent context, two key arguments have been leveled
against clarification. The first is that those suspects whose ambiguity
was actually intended to invoke the right to silence will view further
police questioning as coercive.1 7' A second related argument is that
165

James

J. Tomkovicz, Standardsfor Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession

Contexts, 71 IOWAL.REv. 975, 1016 n.158 (1986).
166 Cf United States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d 971, 975 (2d
Cir. 1988) (recognizing that
"[a] Ilowing custodial authorities to clarify ambiguous requests [for counsel] will help
them, as well as reviewing courts, to determine on which side of the [Edwards] bright
line the request falls").
167 Every motion filed in a federal court must be signed by an attorney
of record
who thereby certifies "that to the best of the [signer's] knowledge, information, and
belief formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances ...the claims,
defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or
the establishment of new law[.]" FED. R. Civ. P. 11. An attorney who violates Rule

11 may be required to pay the other parties' reasonable costs and attorney's fees. See
id.
:68

9

See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the benefits of the clarification approach proposed by this

Article, see supraPart IV.A.2.
170 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 475 (1994)
(Souter,J., concurring).
171 See Petitioner's Brief, at 29-30, Davis (No. 92-1949); Reply
Brief at 6, Davis v.
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police will manipulate the clarification opportunity toward subtly influencing a suspect to waive his rights and speak where he might not
otherwise do so freely. 72 Each view is problematic. While the first
rests on an unlikely assessment of a suspect's response to properly
administered clarification attempts, the second contradicts the entire
structure upon which Mirandawas built. Both arguments, however,
warrant a closer analysis.
1. Perceived Coercion
Suspects in custody who ambiguously invoke their rights may in
fact be the persons most susceptible to police coercion, whether intentional or not.17 As a result, it has been argued, an individual who
believes he has invoked his right to silence, but whose ambiguity subjects him to further clarifying questions, is likely to view such questioning as indicative of the police's intent to dishonor his rights.7
Thus resigned to believing that the promise of Mirandais more ritual
than right, such suspects may be inclined to talk begrudgingly where
they might otherwise choose silence over speech. Therefore, according to this view, clarification will effectively deprive the most susceptible suspects of the control over
the interrogation that the right to
175
silence was intended to permit.

Contrary to this argument, however, properly administered and
narrowly limited questions designed to discern a suspect's intent will
not likely be viewed as coercive. 176 In fact, it is more likely that such
questions will impress upon the individual that the police are prepared to honor his choice but must first determine whether a choice
United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (No. 92-1949).
17
See Petitioner's Brief, at 29-30, Davis (No. 92-1949); Transcript of Oral Argument at 19-20, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (No. 92-1949) (argument

of counsel for petitioner Robert L. Davis).
:73

74

See generally Reply Brief, Davis (No. 92-1949).

See, e.g., Davis, 512 U.S. at 472-73, in which Justice Souter argued in a concur-

rence:
When a suspect understands his (expressed) wishes to have been ignored (and by hypothesis, he has said something that an objective listener could "reasonably," although not necessarily, take to be a request), in contravention of the "rights" just read to him by his
interrogator, he may well see further objection as futile and confession
(true or not) as the only way to end his interrogation.
Id. (Souter,J., concurring).
175
See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1975) (stating that "[t] hrough the
exercise of his option to terminate questioning [a suspect] can control the time at
which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the duration of the interrogation").
176 Properly administered questions are those administered
in accordance with
the proposed guidelines. See infra text accompanying notes 192-206.

1998] AMBIGUOUS INVOCATIONS OFRIGHT TO SILENCE

591

has been made. This realization on the suspect's part should help to
dispel a primary cause of ambiguous or vague speech. Social science
has confirmed the debilitating effect that the interrogation atmosphere can have on many suspects' ability to assert themselves linguistically.'7 According to one commentator, speakers hedge as a linguistic mechanism to avoid conflict. "The speaker's [language] is
delivered as suggestions, innuendoes, implications, insinuations, or
inferences. This use of indirect speech patterns in order to avoid
conflict is the hallmark of a pragmatic usage [of language] by persons without power .... ,,,, While the interrogation atmosphere is
designed to instill the very feeling of powerlessness that ultimately is
often manifested as ambiguous or equivocal speech 9 clarification
may help neutralize that feeling and thereby aid the individual in

177 See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
178 Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmaticsof Powerlessness in Police
Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 318 (1993); see also Davis v, United States, 512 U.S.
452, 470 n.4 (1994) (Souter,J., concurring). Justice Souter relied on socio-linguistic
analysis and stated that "individuals who feel intimidated or powerless are more
likely to speak in equivocal or nonstandard terms when no ambiguity or equivocation is meant. Suspects in police interrogation are strong candidates for these effects." See id. (citing WILLUAM O'BARR, LINGUISTIc EVIDENCE: LANGUAGE, POWER, AND
STRATEGY IN THE COURTROoM 61-71 (1982)).
Professor Ainsworth has identified,
"hedges" and the use of "modal verbs" as two common types of indirect and tentative
modes of expression. See Ainsworth, supra, at 275-80. Hedges are defined as "lexical
expressions that function to attenuate the emphasis of a statement." Id. at 276-77.
Hedges convey either the speaker's uncertainty or "that the speaker prefers not to
confront the addressee with a bald assertion." Id. at 276. Examples of hedges include "I think," "I guess," "I suppose," "maybe," and "perhaps." Id. Modal verbs include such indefinite terms as "may," "might," "could," "should," and "must." Id. at
280. Statements employing either hedges or modal verbs are commonly referred to
as "vague" or "ambiguous" by courts, which do not generally recognize such linguistic distinctions. See supra note 22. A review of the case law reveals a strikingly frequent use of hedges and modal verbs by suspects whose statements have been found
to be ambiguous. See, e.g., Davis, 512 U.S. at 455, 459-60 (holding that the words,
"Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" are not an invocation); State v. Eastlack, 883 P.2d
999, 1005 (Ariz. 1994) (holding that the words, "I think I better talk to a lawyer first"
are not an invocation); State v. Howard, 324 N.W.2d 216, 220-22 (Minn. 1982)
(holding that the words, "I don't think I better say anymore - till I have an attorney" are not an invocation); People v. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d 537, 540 (Ill. 1980)
(holding that the words, "Maybe I ought to have an attorney" are not an invocation).
Reflecting their custodial surroundings, suspects also occasionally make statements
that, while not employing hedge words or modal verbs, nonetheless reveal a concern
to appease their interrogators. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 630 So. 2d 481, 483 (Ala.
1993) (explaining that the suspect asked, "Is it going to piss ya'll off if I ask for my
to talk to a friend that is an attorney?").
171J See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-55,
457 (1966) (describing police
interrogation strategies designed to "subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner").
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more clearly expressing his intent by demonstrating the police's concern for the suspect's ability immediately to cut off all questioning.
In addition, since the ambiguity shifts to police the obligation of
framing properly limited questions, the clarification process will further ease the suspect's burden of formulating a "clear" invocation
and thus tend to negate the anxiety which may have led to equivocality in the first instance. " ' Questions designed to ascertain "intent"
rather than "information" 8 ' should invite simple "yes" or "no" responses and, thus, far from coercing a suspect to speak against his
will, should
facilitate the assertion of the right to silence if in fact it is
2
desired.1

To further ensure against the possibility of coercion, information obtained by questions exceeding the narrow purpose of clarification would be inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt. 8 3 In sum,

because properly administered questions should make it easier rather
180 See Charles R. Shreffler, Jr., Note, JudicialApproaches to
the Ambiguous Request for
Counsel Since Miranda v. Arizona, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 460, 473 (1987)
(recognizing that clarification "shifts some of the pressure of a custodial interrogation from the suspect to law enforcement officials"). It seems plausible to conclude
that much of the anxiety created by the custodial atmosphere is that for many suspects, custodial surroundings are unfamiliar territory. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 469
(SouterJ., concurring) (recognizing that many individuals in police custody will be
"overwhelmed by the uncertainty of their predicament"). For many more suspects,
the legal requirement of having to invoke one's rights, and to do so with precision, is
even more foreign. See Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513, 516 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc)
(noting that the custodial suspect, unsure of how to invoke the right to counsel,
asked whether he had to make a written request).
181 See infta notes 192-206 and accompanying text (discussing appropriate guidelines for formulating clarifying questions).
182 The recognition that properly phrased questions
should invite simple "yes" or
no" responses is not inconsistent with this proposal's guidelines that prohibit questions from improperly suggesting the answer desired by the interrogator. See infra
text accompanying notes 201-03.
While rules of evidence commonly associate
"leading questions" with those which invite "yes" or "no" responses, the converse is
not necessarily true. See MCCORMIcK ON EVIDENCE § 6, at 17-18 (4th ed. 1992)
(recognizing and criticizing the association of simple responses with leading questions). For example, police officers may routinely seek to clarify a suspect's ambiguity by asking the non-leading, yes-or-no question, "Are you invoking your right to
remain silent?" Id. (stating that "[t]he whole issue is whether an ordinary man
would get the impression that the questioner desired one answer rather than another."); ROBERT A. BARKER & VINCENT C. ALEXANDER, EVIDENCE IN NEW YORK STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS § 611.2, at 466 (1996) (defining a leading question as "one
which suggests the answer that the questioner wants to elicit").
183 Suppression of statements obtained in violation of procedural safeguards designed to protect the privilege against self-incrimination would not break new
ground. See cases cited supra note 164; see also United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d
1398, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that if police questioning exceeded proper clarification purpose following an ambiguous request for counsel, any directly resulting
statement(s) must be suppressed).
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than more difficult for suspects to invoke clearly their rights, and because the threat of suppression provides incentive to guard against
improper questions, the concern with perceived coercion must be
considered to be de minimis.
2. Subtle Manipulation
A related argument against clarification is that the police will
subvert the process into an opportunity to influence suspects to
forego their rights. s4 This argument is not without appeal. 85 Ultimately, however, it must be rejected, for its underlying premise that police cannot be trusted to discharge their law enforcement obligations consistent with Miranda and its progeny - has ultimately
proved false. 186 Moreover, the proposed approach incorporates a
number of enforceable guidelines developed from the substantial
body of pre-Davis case law which followed a clarification rule in the
right-to-counsel context. 8 7 These guidelines both instruct the police
on how properly to discharge their duties and serve the evidentiary
function of developing the record of the critical exchange between
the police and the suspect.
One of the underlying presumptions of Miranda is that the police must be relied upon to comply with the legal rules governing
Indeed, a contrary approach would have
custodial interrogations.'
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 16-18, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452
(1994) (No. 92-1949) (colloquy between Justice Souter and counsel for the petitioner Davis); Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513, 526 (5th Cir. 1979) (Godbold, J., dissenting) (arguing against the clarification approach in the right-to-counsel context that
"officers will seek to find, or even to create, equivocalness where there is none and
in so doing force the suspect constantly to reassert his right to counsel."); Matthew
W.D. Bowman, Note, The Right to Counsel DuringCustodial Interrogation: Equivocal References to an Attorney - Determining What Statements or Conduct Should Constitute an Accused's Invocation of the Right to Counsel, 39 VAIND. L. REV. 1159, 1189 (1986)
(articulating a similar argument).
185 See, e.g., Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 770 n.2 (5th Cir.
1979) (after
an individual stated a desire to make a statement to an attorney before talking to the
police, officers informed the suspect that he could tell them just as well and if he
told an attorney, that attorney would not be able to tell the police); see also Holly,
supra note 133, at 558-59 (discussing the role of mistrust of police power in the
Fourth Amendment context) (citing Tracy Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth
184

Amendment, 35 WM. & MARYL. REV. 197, 201 (1993)).
87 See infra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
18

See infra notes 192-206 and accompanying text.

188

See Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452

(1994) (No. 92-1949) (comment from the bench explaining "the whole Miranda
structure, we can just do away with all of it if we must proceed on the assumption
that interrogating officials cannot be trusted, because they can always come in and
lie and say we gave him Miranda rights and he waived.").
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the perverse effect of allowing police lawlessness, whether real or
imaginary, to curtail effectively the development of procedural safeguards designed to protect constitutional rights. Besides, experience
has shown that the presumption is warranted. Indeed, in the many
pre-Davis years during which the majority of federal courts followed
some version of a clarification rule in the right-to-counsel context,189
there was little, if any, indication of systemic law enforcement abuse
of the clarification process.'9 0 Of course, occasional abuses will always
be found.'' Given the practical and experiential bases for Miranda's
underlying presumption, though, there is little warrant for dispensing with the benefits of clarification based on the hypothecated suggestion of isolated police excesses.
To be sure the clarification process must be proposed in a manner designed to reduce the possibility of police overreaching. In order to give substance to that concern, and with due regard for modern police practices that are "psychologically rather than physically
oriented," 92 clarifying questions should be administered in accordance with well-defined guidelines. 3 The proposed guidelines are
intended to respond to scenarios that may predictably arise during
the clarification process.
Perhaps the most difficult scenario for the police will arise when,
following an ambiguous invocation of the right to silence, a suspect
responds to the officer's clarifying question by asking the officer what
to do.' 94 Faced with this situation, the officer's obligation is clear.
95

The police are prohibited from giving legal advice to a suspect.

See supra note 146.
Assuming the courts are responsive to systemic law enforcement abuses, this
is
a permissible inference from the large majority of courts that chose to adopt some
form of a clarification rule prior to Davis. See cases cited supranote 146.
:91 See, e.g., supra note 185.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966).
13 The guidelines proposed incorporate and
build upon principals established by
those courts which followed a version of the clarification approach in either the
right-to-counsel or right-to-silence context prior to the Davis decision. See supra note
146.
194 See, e.g., United States v. March, 999 F.2d
456, 458 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining
that, during an interrogation, the suspect asked a police officer, "Do you think I
need an attorney?"); United States v. Fouche, 833 F.2d 1284, 1286 (9th Cir. 1987)
(noting that, while in custody after being permitted a telephone call to call an attorney but during which the suspect called his wife, the suspect returned to the interrogation room and asked the officer, "What should I do?"). The typical situation
envisioned here is when an individual is given Mirandawarnings, and responds, for
example, "Well, I suppose I probably shouldn't say anything," and then stops. The
officer seeks clarification by saying, "Do you mean that you wish to invoke your right
to remain silent?", and the suspect responds, "Do you think that's a good idea?"
195 See Wisconsin v. Walkowiak, 515 N.W.2d
863, 868 (Wis. 1994); Crawford v.
89

1998] AMBIGUOUS INVOCATIONS OF RIGHT TO SILENCE

595

Not only might the giving of such advice operate to reinforce the
suspect's mistaken belief regarding the officer's role in the interrogation process, it would likely also violate the jurisdiction's regulations
governing the unauthorized practice of law. 9 6 Beyond the mandatory Miranda warning, the officer should confine his behavior to
clarifying, not advising. 97 Thus, if asked by a suspect how to proceed,
the officer must explain that he may not provide advice. 98 He should
then proceed to clarify the suspect's ambiguity. The officer's response may also, however, permissibly include a reiteration of the Mirandawarnings.99 By so doing, the simple expedient of stressing the
right to counsel may often impart to the individual that he should
turn to a lawyer, not the police, for advice."
Moreover, even in the absence of a question from the accused,
the police are prohibited from using the clarification process as an
opportunity to dissuade a suspect from pursuing one course of action
over another. 0 ' Questions must not invite discussion of the crime beDelaware, 580 A.2d 571, 577 (Del. 1990) (stating that while clarifying an individual's
ambiguous request for counsel the police may not tender legal advice).
9 In most jurisdictions the unauthorized practice of law is criminalized as a misdemeanor. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 15.1.3, at 845 (1986).
Giving legal advice may be a form of unauthorized practice. See id. at 838-39.
17 See Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d
768, 772 (5th Cir. 1979) (explaining
that, while clarifying ambiguous requests for counsel, police are prohibited from
debating with the suspect about whether invoking the counsel right would be in the
suspect's best interest and may not presume to tell the suspect what counsel's advice
would be because "such measures are foreign to the purpose of clarification, which
is not to persuade but to discern").
198 See, e.g., Fouche, 833 F.2d at 1288 (noting
that, in response to a suspect's question, "What should I do?", the officer explained that he was not a lawyer and could
not'ive advice).
See Crawford, 580 A.2d at 577 (suggesting this option, though for slightly different reasons).
200 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 833 F.2d
1464, 1466 (11th Cir. 1987)
(finding that ambiguity was raised by the suspect's statement that she tried to retain
counsel but could not afford the cost dispelled by a subsequent reading of Miranda
warnings, which provided that counsel could be appointed). As stated, repeating
the Miranda warnings in this situation would not be intended to serve a
"clarification" purpose because prior to proceeding to clarification, the officer must
first respond to the difficulty of being asked by the suspect what to do. While the
proposed approach would permit the officer to respond appropriately to such an inquiry, as indicated in the text, it would not require the officer to respond. Thus, if
asked by a suspect what to do, under the proposed approach, the police may properly ignore the inquiry and proceed to attempt to clarify the initial ambiguous invocation. While it would seem that the better practice would be to respond quickly to
the suspect's inquiry, lest the unanswered question obfuscate the clarification process, this choice is best left to the officer who, without exercising an intolerable degree of discretion, can ascertain which option is best given the particular circumstances before him.
201
SeeMueller v. Virginia. 507 U.S. 1043 (1993) (White, J., dissenting from denial
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ing investigated 212 and may not suggest, either by form or tone, the
answer desired by the interrogator. 3 Clarification is not to be used
as a subterfuge for intimidation. Thus, where in response to an ambiguous invocation, the interrogator asks (in a neutral tone), "You
don't intend to invoke your right to silence, do you?", the officer has
suggested the response to his question, and thereby improperly, 2 if
only subtly, attempted to coerce the suspect not to invoke his right. 04
Likewise, where through sarcasm, ridicule, or intimidation a properly
formed question suggests by its tone the answer desired by the interrogator, the limited clarification purpose has been exceeded and resulting statements would be suppressed.0 5 In sum, the police must
of certiorari) (noting that the suspect asked a police officer during interrogation,
"Do you think I need an attorney here?" to which the officer responded by "shaking
his head slightly from side to side, shrugging, and stating: 'You're just talking to
us. ").

See Brief for United States at 22, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994)
(No. 92-1949). Questions designed to elicit substantive information about the offense under investigation have an investigative rather than clarifying purpose and
therefore are irrelevant to the clarification process.
203 See State v. Walkowiak, 515 N.W.2d 863, 870 (Wis. 1994)
(Abrahamson,J., concurring) (recognizing that police officers should not use the tone of their voice to
manipulate subtly the clarification process).
204 See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199,
206 (1960) (recognizing that
"coercion can be mental as well as physical, and... the blood of the accused is not
the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition."). See also W.H. Enfield, Direct
Examination of Witnesses, 15 ARK. L. REV. 32, 35 (1960), in which the author states, in
the context of questioning witnesses during trial, that "an otherwise unobjectionable
question may become leading merely by the tone or inflection of voice in which it is
asked." Id. While this Article does not take the extreme position that custodial interrogation should (or could) be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable to trial examination, it does recognize that the reasons for disfavoring some methods of examination apply equally to the courtroom and station house.
For example, one of the reasons for disallowing leading questions during the direct
examination of a trial witness is that "a witness, intending to be entirely fair and
honest, might assent to a leading question which did not express his real meaning[.]" G. Stephen Denroche, Leading Questions, 6 CRiM. L.Q. 21, 22 (1963). Likewise, a closely related danger is that leading questions may "discourage the witness
from trying to relate her actual memories in favor of acquiescing in the questioner's
version of events[.]" David P. Leonard, Appellate Review of Evidentiary Rulings, 70 N.C.
L. REV. 1155, 1183 n.150 (1992) (citing 3 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 339, at 459-60 (1979)). The analogy to a suspect who
has been "thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police
interrogation," requires no elaboration. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457
(1966).
205 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Davis v.
United States, 512 U.S.
452 (1994) (No. 92-1949), in which Mr. Seamon, Assistant to the Solicitor General,
argued on behalf of the United States:
[A] tone of voice, as much as the contents of what a police officer says,
can tend to influence a suspect either way, and so our position is that
the police have to - police officers have to be neutral both in terms of
what they say and how they say it.
202
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"play it straight with the question '' 20 6 or else face suppression of evidence obtained as a result. By incorporating these guidelines, and
removing the incentive for abusive police questioning, the proposed
approach is responsive to the primary arguments that have been asserted against clarification.
CONCLUSION

The importance to the administration of criminal justice of securing admissions of guilt from those suspected of wrongdoing cannot be doubted. Indeed, the procurement and use of confessions as
an adjunct to a system of successful prosecutions has been described
as "inherently desirable. 0 7 Yet, the efficacy of confessions will not
excuse the methods employed to obtain them. The rule of Davis
does not adequately heed this admonition. Enshrining a suspect in
"rights," which experience shows he may predictably be unable to invoke, bears an unsettling resemblance to the mythic Tantalus who
was condemned to stand eternally in water that receded when he
tried to drink.
In enforcing our criminal law we have learned the valuable lesson that convictions obtained by depreciating the dignity of the individual will, in the long run, engender a disrespect for the law far
more dangerous than the suspects we zealously pursue. Permitting
the police systematically to ignore, without inquiry, ambiguous indications of a citizen's desire to stand on his rights and remain silent in
the face of accusation will inevitably instill in those affected an open
hostility for the law, born of a system perceived as unfair. This Article's proposal was developed with these basic truths in mind. The
proposed model provides a reasoned, practical approach to the recurring problem of ambiguous invocations of the right to remain si-

Id. Potential examples of the improper use of a sarcastic or intimidating tone are
limited only by the creativity of the officer conducting the interrogation. Consistent
with the purpose of eradicating improper intimidation, the proposed approach
would also prohibit the use of intimidating gestures or other unnecessary or irregular displays of authority, which, when used in conjunction with verbal questioning,
create a reasonable probability of influencing an arrestee's decision-making process.
Cf Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 164 (1955) (broadly construing a congressional investigating committee witness' statement as a claim of privilege and reasoning in part, "It is precisely at such times - when the privilege is under attack by
those who wrongly conceive of it as merely a shield for the guilty - that governmental bodies must be most scrupulous in protecting its exercise").
206 Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994)
(No. 92-1949) (quotingJustice Souter).
207 United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977).
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lent while remaining responsive to both law enforcement interests
and individual rights.

